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1 Introduction
In the course of the last two decades, the economics of information goods has become a
very lively discipline. Information goods, deﬁned broadly by Shapiro and Varian (1999, p.
3) as “anything that can be digitized,” have the particular property that they can be copied
basically without quality degradation. This makes them vulnerable to copyright infringement.
Music is the information good that has suﬀered most severely from the violation of intellectual
property rights. Piracy of music has been rampant since the emergence of Internet-based ﬁle
sharing networks in the late 1990s. The music industry claims that this kind of private,
noncommercial piracy is threatening the creation of music at large. Musicians themselves
seem to be divided over whether piracy is good or bad, as a survey of American musicians
and songwriters by the Pew Institute (2004) has shown. Pop star Robbie Williams has been
quoted as saying that piracy is “great” (The Economist, 2003), and several artists have
released their songs for free on the Internet.
At a theoretical level, economists have been studying the welfare implications of copying
for some time. The basic trade-oﬀ policymakers are facing in designing copyright legislation
is between under-utilization and under-production of intellectual property (see Romer, 2002).
Since information goods are largely non-rival (an individual’s consumption of the good does
not aﬀect the quantity of the good available to others), eﬃcient consumption requires all
consumers with a willingness-to-pay exceeding the (small) cost of reproduction to have access
to the good. Therefore, at least in the short run, consumers almost always beneﬁt from the
availability of copies.
Given that the development of an information good is typically associated with a high ﬁxed
cost, the producer would make a loss if he set the price at marginal cost (i.e., reproduction
cost). Copyright confers some market power to the producer and thereby makes market pro-
vision possible. Unauthorized reproduction, however, results in the good being only partially
excludable, and thus erodes the producer’s market power. The resulting decline in proﬁts
reduces the producer’s incentive to create. This leads to a problem of underprovision. Ac-
cordingly, the most basic models, relying on self-selection of consumers in the spirit of Mussa
and Rosen (1978), predict piracy to be harmful to producers, which entails in the long run
also negative repercussions on consumers due to reduced incentives to create (Belleﬂamme,
2003; Yoon, 2002; Bae and Choi, 2006).
There are several reasons why there may actually be less of a conﬂict between consumptive
eﬃciency and incentives for producers than this discussion suggests. A variety of papers have
shown that it may sometimes be proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to allow some degree of piracy.1 The
1 We do not only refer to the obvious case where the costs of complete prevention are so high that producers
prefer to let some consumers obtain the product for free. As noted by King and Lampe (2003, p. 272), research
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ﬁrst case is when producers can indirectly appropriate the consumers’ rent from copying by
charging a higher price to those buyers who are going to have more copies made from their
originals (Liebowitz, 1985). The second case is the presence of positive network eﬀects on
the demand side. If a consumer’s valuation depends on how many others are consuming the
good, piracy allows the monopolist to take advantage of network eﬀects while maintaining
a high price and extracting surplus from high-valuation consumers (Conner and Rumelt,
1991; Takeyama, 1994; Shy and Thisse, 1999). The third case is sampling: since music is an
experience good and tastes are heterogeneous, consumers do not know beforehand whether
or not they like a particular piece of music. File sharing enables consumers to try out new
musical genres and artists, which may under some conditions increase demand (Peitz and
Waelbroeck, 2006b; Zhang, 2002).2
In a contribution speciﬁcally dealing with the music industry, Gayer and Shy (2006) point
to a possible conﬂict between artists and publishers as to the desirability of unauthorized
reproduction of their works. The argument is based on the observation that record sales are
not the only source of income for artists (e.g., live concerts). While publishers may be harmed
by piracy, artists may beneﬁt from the increased recognition of their work that piracy brings
about. The notion that piracy may increase concert revenues has some empirical support
(Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf, 2010; Mortimer, Nosko, and Sorensen, 2010).
From an empirical point of view, ﬁle sharing can provide insights regarding the impact of
unauthorized copying (in particular for testing the diﬀerent hypotheses put forward by the
theoretical literature). So far, there is only limited support for a positive eﬀect of piracy on
demand. On the contrary, most empirical studies indicate that the record industry is being
harmed (Hui and Png, 2003; Peitz and Waelbroeck, 2004; Zentner, 2006; Rob and Waldfo-
gel, 2006; Liebowitz, 2008; Waldfogel, 2010). For example, Rob and Waldfogel (2006) and
Waldfogel (2010) both estimate that the sales displacement produced by illegal downloading
(the marginal eﬀect of illegal downloads on sales) is between -0.15 and -0.3. One exception is
the investigation by Oberholzer and Strumpf (2007), who ﬁnd that piracy has no statistically
discernible eﬀect on album sales. Apart from this controversial result, one interesting point
raised by their work is that the impact of piracy may vary across artists: some may gain
while others may lose. Speciﬁcally, there is heterogeneity of the eﬀect of downloading on
sales between sales categories. The top selling quartile of albums is positively aﬀected by
downloads, while the lowest selling quartile is negatively aﬀected.
In this paper, we present a model with two types of artists that can account for diﬀerential
eﬀects of piracy on high- and low-selling musicians. Its originality lies in the assumption of
on law and economics tells us that this may apply to any unlawful activity provided enforcement is costly.
2 For a review of the literature on piracy, see Peitz and Waehlbroeck (2006a).
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popularity-dependent copying costs. That is, consumers’ cost of downloading depends on an
artist’s level of popularity (assumed exogenous). This modeling is motivated by the obser-
vation that, on average, it is much more time-consuming to ﬁnd and download a recording
from a little known artist than a very popular song. Following Gayer and Shy (2006), we
also incorporate a feature explaining why some artists may be in favor of piracy while others
oppose it by introducing an alternative source of revenues for artists. We do not, however,
address the conﬂict of interest that may exist between artists and record labels.
Our results conﬁrm the ﬁnding obtained in a diﬀerent setting by Gayer and Shy (2006)
according to which artists can be better oﬀ with piracy than without it if alternative revenues
are important. But this applies in an unrestricted way only to the more popular artist. The
less popular artist may still be worse oﬀ under piracy even if alternative revenues are set
at their highest possible level. At ﬁrst glance, this may appear counterintuitive since higher
downloading costs should shield the little known artist from the adverse eﬀects of piracy to
some degree. However, the way in which the artists can beneﬁt from piracy is by using it to
their advantage. In fact, copying constitutes a cheap way of distributing an artist’s recording
to a greater part of his potential audience, thereby increasing the alternative revenues which
are assumed to be linked to the total number of consumers who are knowledgeable about his
music. If the less popular artist’s popularity is in a middle range where downloading costs
are not yet prohibitively high so that his music is still pirated to some extent but not enough
to reach a suﬃcient level of non-CD sale revenues, piracy reduces his proﬁt. From a welfare
perspective, this means that piracy is detrimental at least for musical variety.
We develop a model that takes into account that piracy may aﬀect artists in diﬀerent ways
depending on their level of popularity. To do this, we start from the simple framework of a
monopolist selling to a continuum of consumers who self-select according to their willingness
to pay. Interpreting the ﬁrm as being an artist, we extend that framework by introducing a
second artist. We assume that each of the two artists sells a single good (one can think of the
goods indiﬀerently as single songs or entire albums), and that they diﬀer in their popularity.
Their levels of popularity are exogenously given, and consumers like only one of the two
goods. This implies that there is no competition between artists; both are monopolists in the
market for their respective product. Apart from the sales of their CDs, artists have a second
source of revenues, positively related to the number of users of the good. One can think of
concerts, advertising, or television appearances, for example.
One of the artists, referred to as the “star,” is more popular than the other. Copies of
the most popular artists’ recordings are easier to obtain on ﬁle-sharing networks than those
of relatively unknown artists because, in general, the number of people sharing those ﬁles is
larger. We capture this property by supposing that there are higher downloading costs (for
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consumers) for the less popular artist’s music. Intuitively, we would expect this modelling
to result in a lesser eﬀect of piracy on the “underground” artist, while the star should suﬀer
more. However, this eﬀect might be counterbalanced by the fact that opportunities to make
money out of alternative sources increase with “stardom.” Piracy, by expanding the user base
of a recording, leads to higher revenues from these other sources. If a star’s music is both more
demanded and easier to download and is therefore copied more, we should expect that the star,
while losing more in terms of CD sales, also beneﬁts more from the increased dissemination of
his recording than the less popular artist. In the formal analysis that follows, we examine the
relative strength of these two eﬀects and determine which conditions determine the respective
impact of piracy on the two artists.
The model vis-a`-vis the literature
The general self-selection setup of the model draws on Yoon (2002). There are also similar-
ities with other models in the literature. We now discuss brieﬂy such common features and
elaborate on what distinguishes the current model from the existing literature.
First, like in Zhang (2002), we assume that there are two artists: a star and an under-
ground artist. However, whereas Zhang allows for competition between the two artists who in
his case produce horizontally diﬀerentiated but (imperfectly) substitutable goods (the artists
being located at the ends of the classic Hotelling line), we assume that the two goods are
no substitutes so that demands are independent. This means that, for reasons exogenous to
the model (tastes), consumers are exclusively drawn to one style of music and do not derive
any utility from consuming the other (this is, of course, an extreme assumption). Moreover,
“stardom” is not deﬁned in terms of the ﬁnancial capacity of the label supporting the artist
(as in Zhang), but rather in terms of the proportion of the population who prefer an artist’s
music to the other’s. Also in Alcala´ and Gonza´lez-Maestre (2010), the two types of artist
compete.
Second, we follow Gayer and Shy (2006) in introducing a second source of revenues for
artists. Gayer and Shy, who model a conﬂict of interest between artists and labels, leave the
decision of how to price the CD solely to the record company which is assumed to ignore the
artist’s interest in setting the price. The artist gets a share of the label’s proﬁt. By contrast,
we consider only a single entity which maximizes its total proﬁt taking into account all the
artist’s revenues. This can be seen as a special case of Gayer and Shy’s approach where all
the share of the proﬁt goes to the artist and where the artist takes the pricing decision.
Taking a closer look at the pricing decision, it is clear that both the assumption that
the record company sets the price without regard to the implications for the artist and the
alternative assumption that the artist sets the price are extreme cases. If we accept that there
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is at least some degree of competition between record companies on the “market for artists,”
record companies cannot altogether ignore the artists’ interests. If there is suﬃciently strong
competition for signing promising artists, we may actually converge to the case where the
record companies set the price of CDs as if they were the artist.
Alcala´ and Gonza´lez-Maestre (2010) use an OLG model to endogenize the number of
stars. They incorporate promotion costs that can be reduced by using piracy as a promotion
device. We disregard the promotion component that adds, as the authors show, an incen-
tive to allow piracy, and we focus instead on another transmission channel: the presence of
popularity-dependent copying costs. That is, we allow the costs that consumers incur when
downloading a song from a ﬁle-sharing network to vary across artists depending on their
popularity. Speciﬁcally, since the songs of little known artists are in relatively scarce supply,
they are costlier to download than stars’ music.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the model.
In Section 3, we derive the artists’ pricing decision. In Section 4, we examine the welfare
eﬀects of piracy, the emphasis being on long-term incentives to create. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2 Model setup
There are two artists i: a popular artist (“star,” denoted by the subscript s), and a less
popular artist (“underground,” denoted by the subscript u), producing products that are
suﬃciently horizontally diﬀerentiated for the cross-price elasticity of the demand for each
product to be zero (their products are neither substitutes nor complements). Both of them
are monopolists and their production technology is represented by the aﬃne cost function
Ci(q) = cq + Fi for q > 0, and Ci(0) = 0, (1)
where q is the quantity of reproductions of the recording (CDs), c is a constant per-unit cost
which is the same for both artists, and Fi is the ﬁxed cost of creating the recording (which
may diﬀer between the artists).
There is a mass 1 of consumers, a proportion α of which appreciate (only) the star’s
music, while the remaining (1− α) like (only) the less-known artist’s works, with 12 < α < 1.
Consumers diﬀer in their valuation for music denoted θi, with i = s, u, where the index s
represents those consumers who prefer the star and u those preferring the underground artist.
Both types of consumers have valuations uniformly distributed on [0, 1].3
3 A more general formulation would consist in letting valuations be distributed on [0, θi]. This would allow
for the possibility that the top valuation for the star may be diﬀerent from that for the less-popular artist, i.e.
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Consumers have unit demand for the artists’ product. They have two ways to obtain the
product: they can either buy the original at a price pi, or download a copy on a ﬁle-sharing
network. The consumers’ cost of copying depends on the scarcity of the good, i.e., the star’s
music is less costly to copy than the unknown artist’s music. This is because it is easier to ﬁnd
popular artists’ recordings on ﬁle-sharing networks than very rare works. In particular, the
cost may include the opportunity cost of time spent searching for and downloading the ﬁle.
Given that copying of most musical recordings is illegal, the cost may also include the expected
cost of detection by law enforcement authorities (Crampes and Laﬀont, 2002), although it is
not clear whether this would diﬀer between the two artists. Denoting di the cost of copying
artist i, we assume du > ds, i.e., copying the less popular musician is costlier than copying
the star. Therefore, the utility of a consumer with valuation θi is given by
Uθi =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
θi − pi if she buys the original
βθi − di if she copies
0 otherwise.
The parameter β < 1 represents the quality of the copy relative to that of the original.
Presumably β is close to one. In fact, improvements in compression technology have made
diﬀerences in sound quality quite small, although, of course, there remains some quality
degradation due to lacking cover, song lyrics and other material included with the original of
the recording.4
Artists have two sources of income: sales of their recordings, and revenues from various
sources such as concerts, merchandizing, licensing, advertising, or television appearances,
to name just a few. We assume that revenues other than CD sales depend positively on the
artists’ recognition as measured by the number of agents who consume their music (regardless
of whether they bought or copied it). Moreover, there are increasing returns with respect to
the number of users: marginal revenue from the alternative sources is increasing in the total
number of distributed recordings. This reﬂects the fact that a small number of highly popular
musicians get the bulk of lucrative advertising contracts and television appearances. Also,
there are likely to be increasing returns to scale for live performances, and consumers are
θs = θu. One could make the argument that the highest valuation may be higher within consumers who like
the star than within those loving the underground artist. A justiﬁcation could come from the possible existence
of network eﬀects: If the willingness to pay of consumers depends positively on the total number of people
who are knowledgeable about the recording, the top valuation for the star may be higher than that for the
less-popular artist. However, the argument for network eﬀects is rather weak in the case of music. Therefore,
it is diﬃcult to see why the respective top-valuation consumer’s appreciation for the star should be greater
than for less-known artist, absent objective diﬀerences in quality. Then, we should assume θs = θu = θ, and
without loss of generality we can normalize θ to 1.
4 It should also be noted that new technologies such as the Blu-ray Disc have once again introduced more
of quality wedge between illegally downloaded and legally sold versions of an album.
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willing to pay higher prices to see top acts. Accordingly, the revenue function of each artist
takes the form
R(q, x) = P (q)q +Φ(q + x), with Φ(0) = 0,Φ′ > 0,Φ′′ > 0, (2)
where P (q) is inverse demand for CDs and Φ(·) is other revenues, while x is the number
of copies made (so that x+ q is the total number of users of the recording). For the sake of
concreteness and simplicity, we suppose in the following that Φ(·) is quadratic, i.e.
Φ(q + x) = φ(q + x)2,
where the parameter φ > 0 determines the importance of non-CD sale revenues in the artists’
income.
Interestingly, this (quadratic) speciﬁcation also arises naturally when the demand for live
performances (as one particular source of alternative revenues) is explicitly modeled, as in the
model of Gayer and Shy (2006). Our speciﬁcation can therefore be interpreted as a reduced
form of a model where the artist has a second activity whose demand depends (linearly) on
the number of distributed recordings.
Given this setup, we assume that artists set the price of the recording (or equivalently,
since both are monopolists, the quantity qi) so as to maximize their proﬁt which we deﬁne in
gross terms (before subtraction of the ﬁxed creation cost Fi), i.e. πi = Ri(qi)− cqi.
As far as terminology is concerned, we should stress one important distinction. In what
follows, we use the term popularity to refer to the (exogenous) proportion of consumers who
like a given artist (i.e., α or 1 − α), whereas by an artist’s recognition we mean the total
number of distributed recordings (legally sold originals plus illegally downloaded copies).
3 Proﬁt maximization
3.1 No piracy
Suppose ﬁrst that copying is not possible, so that users only have the choice between buying
the good and refraining from consuming it. Then, consumers buy if θi − pi ≥ 0, otherwise,
they don’t consume. Hence, the demand addressed to the artists is
Ds(ps) = α(1− ps) for the star artist, and
Du(pu) = (1− α)(1− pu) for the less popular artist.
We can calculate inverse demand to obtain:
Ps(qs) = 1− qs
α
,
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Pu(qu) = 1− qu
1− α.
Using the revenue function speciﬁed in (2), and substituting for P (q), we obtain marginal
revenue:
MRs(qs) = 1− 2qs
(
1
α
− φ
)
,
MRu(qu) = 1− 2qu
(
1
1− α − φ
)
.
The monopolists maximize proﬁts by equalizing marginal revenue and marginal cost (given
by c). This yields the optimal quantities and optimal prices under the no piracy regime
(indexed by the superscript 0):
q0s =
α(1− c)
2(1− αφ) ; p
0
s =
1 + c− 2αφ
2(1− αφ) ; q
0
u =
(1− α)(1− c)
2(1− (1− α)φ) ; p
0
u =
1 + c− 2(1− α)φ
2(1− αφ) . (3)
These follow directly from the ﬁrst-order conditions of the artists’ maximization problem.
In addition, for the second order condition to be satisﬁed, we need φ < 1α (which implies
also φ < 11−α). This restriction on φ makes sure that marginal revenue is downward sloping
for both artists. If it is not satisﬁed (i.e., if φ is too large), so that marginal revenue slopes
upward, the artists want to produce the highest possible quantity since any loss from CD
sales is more than compensated by the gain in terms of other revenues. For both artists to
produce a strictly positive quantity, we also need consumers’ maximum willingness to pay to
exceed marginal cost, that is c < 1.
It is instructive to compare these optimal price-quantity pairs to those that would prevail
in the absence of a second source of revenues (which corresponds to φ = 0). In that case, prices
would be 1+c2 for both artists and thus higher than those given by (3) (accordingly, optimal
quantities would be smaller). This is to be expected since non-CD sale revenues depend
positively on the artists’ recognition. In the absence of piracy, recognition is equivalent to
the number of CDs sold. Hence, the artist ﬁnds it optimal to lower his price in order to gain
recognition and beneﬁt from increased non-CD sale revenues.
We can then also calculate the gross proﬁt π0i of each artist i, deﬁned as the proﬁt before
deduction of the ﬁxed development cost. Since, in the absence of piracy, x = 0, we have
π0i = Ri(q
0
i )− cq0i = (Pi(q0i )− c)q0i + φ(q0i )2, (4)
so
π0s =
α(1− c)2
4(1− αφ) (5)
π0u =
(1− α)(1− c)2
4(1− (1− α)φ) (6)
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Figure 1: Self-selection of consumers
Since by assumption α > 1/2 , the proﬁt of the underground artist is lower than the
star’s. The same applies to the quantity sold. At the same time, the price charged by the
less-popular artist is higher than the star’s. This is due to the convexity of the function Φ(·)
which determines non-CD sale revenues. In fact, for a given price, the star faces a larger
demand, and can exploit the gains from recognition more easily. More precisely, his marginal
revenue from sources other than CD sales is higher than for the less popular artist. Therefore,
he chooses to set his price below the level chosen by the less popular artist.
One interesting consequence of this is that the star serves a higher percentage of his
potential audience than the less popular artist. This can be easily veriﬁed by taking the
ratios q0s/α and q
0
u/(1 − α) which represent the part of each artist’s potential audience that
is actually being served.
3.2 Piracy
Now suppose that consumers can either buy or copy the product sold by the artists. Depend-
ing on their valuation, consumers either buy or copy or do not consume at all:
• if θi − pi ≥ βθi − di ≥ 0, they buy the original;
• if θi − pi < βθi − di, but βθi − di ≥ 0, they download an unauthorized reproduction;
• if θi − pi < 0 and βθi − di < 0, they do not consume the good.
We can then determine the threshold values of θi which delimit non-consumers from
copiers, and copiers from buyers. They are depicted in Figure 1 (which is valid as long as
pi >
di
β ). Those consumers with θi ∈
[
0, diβ
)
don’t consume, those with θi ∈
[
di
β ,
pi−di
1−β
)
download a copy, and those with θi ∈
[
pi−di
1−β , 1
]
purchase the original.
To illustrate the substitution of copies for originals that takes place, suppose that the price
for music, pi, was above
di
β in the absence of piracy. This implies that pi <
pi−di
1−β . Suppose
for a second that the artist leaves his price unchanged in the presence of ﬁle sharing. If we
rewrite the consumer’s utility if copying as θi− (1−β)θi− di, we see that the cost of copying
can be decomposed in two parts: the reproduction cost di which is constant across consumers,
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and the degradation cost (1 − β)θi which is proportional to the consumer’s valuation. For
the consumers with the lowest valuation (between 0 and diβ ), the possibility to copy doesn’t
change anything: they still don’t ﬁnd it worthwhile to consume the good. Similarly, the
highest-valuation consumers continue to buy the original even when copies are available since
their total copying costs (deﬁned as the sum of reproduction and degradation costs) exceed
the price. However, in between those two groups, there are two kinds of consumers. Some
consumers who would not have consumed the good in the absence of piracy now ﬁnd it
worthwhile to download a copy. Some others, though, who would have purchased the original
if piracy were not an option, now switch to the alternative procurement technology that
consists in downloading the ﬁle. Those latter consumers, located between pi and
pi−di
1−β are
the ones who substitute copies for originals.
From Figure 1, we can see that a necessary condition for piracy to take place is diβ < 1.
Otherwise, copying is never an option for any consumer. Moreover, if pi ≤ diβ , there is no
copying in the respective artist’s market. This oﬀers the artist a possibility to deter piracy.
We come back to this below when we study the pricing decision. At this stage, the important
point is the implication that we get a kinked demand curve, with the kink being located at
(ps; qs) =
(
ds
β ;α
(
1− dsβ
))
and (pu; qu) =
(
du
β ; (1− α)
(
1− duβ
))
, respectively. For prices
below the kink, demand is the same as before. For prices above the kink, demand can be
easily derived from the scheme presented in Figure 1 above.
Demand is then completely described by:
Ds(ps) =
⎧⎨
⎩
α(1− ps) if ps ≤ dsβ
α(1− ps−ds1−β ) if ps ≥ dsβ
(7)
Du(pu) =
⎧⎨
⎩
(1− α)(1− pu) if pu ≤ duβ
(1− α)(1− pu−du1−β ) if pu ≥ duβ
(8)
From this we compute the inverse demand:
ps(qs) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1− qsα if qs ≥ α(1− dsβ )
(1− β)(1− qsα ) + ds if qs < α(1− dsβ )
(9)
pu(qu) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1− qu1−α if qu ≥ (1− α)(1− duβ )
(1− β)(1− qu1−α) + du if qu < (1− α)(1− duβ )
(10)
Figure 2 shows the resulting kinked demand function in the case of the star. The less
popular artist faces a similar demand (it suﬃces to replace α by (1− α) and ds by du).
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Figure 2: The kinked demand curve
To deduce marginal revenue, notice that under piracy, revenue from other sources does
not solely depend on the number of recordings sold. Speciﬁcally, as long as copying takes
place (that is, for prices above the limit price) the recognition of the artist is constant. This is
because the number of consumers who remain out of the market (that is, who don’t consume)
is determined only by exogenous parameters (β and d) as we can see from Figure 1.
The total number of agents consuming an artist’s product is also constant and thus inde-
pendent of q. It is given by α(1− dsβ ) and (1− α)(1− duβ ), respectively. We therefore obtain
the following marginal revenue functions:
MRs(qs) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1− 2qs( 1α − φ) if qs ≥ α(1− dsβ )
(1− β)(1− 2qsα ) + ds if qs < α(1− dsβ )
(11)
MRu(qu) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1− 2qu( 11−α − φ) if qu ≥ (1− α)(1− duβ )
(1− β)(1− 2qu1−α) + du if qu < (1− α)(1− duβ )
(12)
This is illustrated in Figure 3, where the bold curve represents marginal revenue. The
marginal revenue function exhibits a discontinuity at the point corresponding to the kink of
the demand curve. If it were not for the parameter φ, this would not present a problem.
However, the presence of φ may lead to technical diﬃculties if the discontinuity is such that
marginal cost can intersect MR twice. This occurs whenever φ is too large. In fact, the slope
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Figure 3: The marginal revenue
of the part of the curve that is located to the right of the discontinuity depends on φ. As φ
increases, the second part of the MR curve becomes ﬂatter.
We can impose a restriction on φ to rule out the possibility of double intersection. As it
turns out, the necessary assumption is not a strong one. In fact, we must have (for the star)
1− β + ds − 2(1− β)
α
(
α
(
1− ds
β
))
≥ 1− 2
(
1
α
− φ
)(
α
(
1− ds
β
))
⇔ φ ≤ β
2α
(13)
If the restriction is met with equality, the marginal revenue function for the star is contin-
uous. Similarly, for the underground artist, we need φ ≤ β2(1−α) , but this condition is implied
by the condition for the star.
We assume in the following that condition (13) is satisﬁed. There are two reasons why
this should not be considered a strong assumption. First, the numerical example in the
following subsection shows that in spite of this restriction (which places an upper bound on
the importance of alternative sources of revenue), the part of non-CD sale revenues in gross
proﬁts can still be very signiﬁcant (especially for the star). Second, if, as we should assume,
β is close to one, this is basically the same assumption as the one we would need in order
to exclude dumping (i.e., price below marginal cost) under the no-piracy regime.5 Since CDs
certainly were not priced below their marginal cost of production before the emergence of
5 To exclude dumping, we must have p0i ≥ c ⇔ 1− 1−c2(1−αφ) ≥ c∧1− 1−c2(1−(1−α)φ) ≥ c ⇔ φ ≤ 12α ∧φ ≤ 12(1−α) .
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large-scale private piracy via ﬁle-sharing networks, this does not seem like much of a stretch.
We can then study the pricing decision of the artists when piracy is possible. Depending
on where marginal cost intersects marginal revenue (see Figure 3), we have four possible cases.
We can use the terminology introduced by Bain (1956) to classify the ﬁrst three of those cases
as accommodation, deterrence and blockade. Following the convention in the literature, the
conditions for each of those cases can be expressed as depending on the reproduction cost di.
For the star artist:
• if
ds <
β(1− β + c)
2− β (14)
we are in the situation where the artist accommodates piracy. The optimal price is
the one corresponding to the quantity that solves (1 − β)
(
1− 2qsα
)
+ ds = c, which is
q1s =
α(1−β+ds−c)
2(1−β) , implying that p
1
s =
1−β+ds−c
2 . In ﬁgure 3, this corresponds to the
case where marginal cost intersects the upper part of marginal revenue (left of the kink).
The gross proﬁt associated with this solution is π1s =
α(1−β+ds−c)2
4(1−β) + φ
(
α
(
1− dsβ
))2
.
• If
β(1− β + c)
2− β ≤ ds <
β(1 + c− 2αφ)
2(1− αφ) , (15)
the optimal price is the limit price p2s =
ds
β which deters pirates. The corresponding
quantity is given by q2s = α
(
1− dsβ
)
, and proﬁt equals π2s = α
(
ds
β − c
)(
1− dsβ
)
+
φ
(
α
(
1− dsβ
))2
.
• If
ds ≥ β(1 + c− 2αφ)
2(1− αφ) , (16)
reproduction costs are too high for piracy to present a threat to the artist. This cor-
responds to the case where marginal cost intersects the lower part of marginal revenue
in ﬁgure 3. Piracy is blockaded and the artist can charge the monopoly price under no
piracy, p0s = 1− 1−c2(1−αφ) .
• For completeness, we also need to consider the case where c > 1 − β + ds. In this
case, the producer cannot gain a positive margin on the sales of his recordings. In the
absence of other revenues, the market would break down. However, since as soon as
q is strictly positive, the artist - due to piracy - reaches the same level of recognition
as with any other qs < α
(
1− dsβ
)
, he always receives the “ﬁxed” amount of other
revenues φ
(
α
(
1− dsβ
))2
regardless of how many CDs he sells. Therefore, he sets the
price at 1− β + ds − ε, where ε is small, so that he sells an inﬁnitesimal quantity of his
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No piracy Piracy
Star Underground Star Underground
Quantity sold 0.333 0.133 0.111 0.167
Price 0.5 0.6 0.375 0.458
Total proﬁt 0.111 0.044 0.139 0.038
Non-CD sale revenues 0.056 0.009 0.134 0.017
Non-CD sale revenues/proﬁt 50% 20% 96.7% 45.1%
Part of audience served 50% 40% 16.7% 50%
Part pirating 0 0 61.1% 5.6%
Total part consuming 50% 40% 77.8% 55.6%
Table 1: A numerical example
recording (albeit at a loss). Thanks to piracy, this enables him to reap the beneﬁts of
his recognition.
Once again, thanks to the symmetry of the problem, the same holds for the underground
artist, replacing α by (1− α) and ds by du.
3.3 A numerical example
The following table presents some key results of the model by means of a numerical example.
We compare the no-piracy and the piracy regimes assuming, for that example, that condition
(14) is fulﬁlled for both artists, i.e., di <
β(1−β+c)
2−β , and therefore that both artists’ music is
pirated. Furthermore, we set the importance of non-CD sale revenues, as measured by φ, at
slightly below its highest possible value still satisfying the restriction imposed by (13). The
table is based on the following parameter values: α = 2/3, β = 3/4, c = 1/3, ds = 1/6, du =
1/3, φ = 1/2.
For the no-piracy regime, the example exhibits all the properties discussed above: the star
sells a higher quantity, charges a lower price, and makes more proﬁts than the less popular
artist. His revenues from alternative sources are much higher than the less popular artist’s;
they account for 50 percent of his proﬁts (compared to 20 percent for the underground artist).
He also serves a larger percentage of his potential audience than the less popular artist.
The picture changes when piracy is possible. While both artists reduce their price in the
face of “competition” from pirates, the number of CDs sold by the star falls by two thirds
whereas the underground artist actually sells more than before. The quantity sold by the
underground artist now exceeds what the star sells. This pattern is reversed when we look
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at proﬁts: The star beneﬁts from piracy and increases his proﬁts above the level witnessed in
the absence of piracy, whereas the less popular artist loses. Whether there is some regularity
to this phenomenon (the eﬀect of piracy on the artists’ proﬁts having opposite signs for the
star and the less-popular artist) is discussed in the following subsection.
Other noteworthy features include the fact that the star now gains 97 percent of his proﬁts
from activities other than CD sales, and that 61 percent of his potential customers download
a copy of his product while only 17 percent buy the original (we cannot, however, exactly
quantify the substitution eﬀect since the artist changes his price in response to the availability
of ﬁle sharing). For the less-known artist, only 6 percent of his potential audience pirates
the good. This discrepancy is induced by the fact that the downloading cost for the less
popular artist is twice as high as for the star, which reduces the interval of valuations for
which copying takes place (see Figure 1). For both artists, the total percentage of consumers
who obtain the product in one way or another is considerably higher than without piracy.
4 Welfare analysis
4.1 Short-term welfare
To evaluate the eﬀect of piracy on short-term welfare, we need to compute the total surplus
(net consumer surplus plus proﬁt) under the assumption that both artists are in the market.
There are several problems with this methodology. First, it may not be very meaningful to
calculate surplus in the current model. In the partial equilibrium setting of the model, the
source of non-CD sale revenues is not explicitly modeled: In a way, those revenues fall like
manna from heaven. In reality, somebody has to pay for them. This may not be overly
problematic in the case of concerts, where consumers pay directly for their tickets. However,
it is much more of a concern when we think of other sources of revenue such as advertising
which is sometimes considered wasteful from a social point of view. Still, we could overcome
this problem by making the assumption that consumers derive zero net surplus from these
other activities (i.e., that the artist extracts the entire surplus) since otherwise they would
not pay for them. In other words, we could assume away socially wasteful activities.
Second, however, it is diﬃcult enough to determine whether the artists win or lose from
piracy, let alone quantify the gain or loss, as the following subsection shows. That means
that actually calculating the diﬀerence in surplus between the two regimes (piracy versus no
piracy) is likely to be prohibitively complicated.
Nevertheless, we can make an informed guess about the short-term welfare consequences of
piracy in our model based on other results in the literature. The eﬀect of piracy on consumer
surplus is sure to be positive: in both the case of deterrence and the case of accommodation,
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it gives more consumers access to the goods, and prices decrease. One result of the literature
discussed in the introduction is that, in a model with linear demand as in our case, although
producer proﬁts decline, this decline is more than oﬀset by an increase in consumer surplus,
so that the total eﬀect of piracy on social welfare is unambiguously positive (Belleﬂamme
2003). In our case, due to the presence of a second source of revenues for artists, it is not even
sure that artists’ proﬁts decline, as we see below. Therefore, we conclude that in our model,
too, the increase in consumer surplus exceeds any possible decline in proﬁts. This means that
the short-term welfare eﬀect of piracy is positive.
4.2 Long-term welfare
For the long-term consequences of piracy for welfare, the important question is whether the
artists’ incentives to produce music remain intact. We thus have to analyze what happens
to their proﬁts under piracy. To do this, we make the assumption that the ﬁxed cost Fi of
developing the recording can diﬀer between the artists. Such a diﬀerence might stem from
diﬀerent costs of writing the song, recording and mixing the initial master tape, or from
diﬀerent promotion and advertising expenditures, for example. Assuming that Fi can vary
across artists makes the analysis of long-term welfare straightforward: If at least one artist’s
proﬁt deteriorates as a result of piracy, this potentially destroys his incentives to create and
must therefore be considered as detrimental from an ex ante eﬃciency perspective.
Let us assume that the condition for piracy to occur (equation (14)) holds. Piracy is
beneﬁcial to the star if and only if proﬁt under piracy is greater than proﬁt without piracy,
that is,
π1s =
α(1− β + ds − c)2
4(1− β) + φ
(
α
(
1− ds
β
))2
≥ π0s =
α(1− c)2
4(1− αφ) (17a)
⇐⇒ Δπs ≡ π1s − π0s =
α(1− β + ds − c)2
4(1− β) + φ
(
α
(
1− ds
β
))2
− α(1− c)
2
4(1− αφ) ≥ 0. (17b)
Intuitively, we would expect that piracy is more beneﬁcial to the musician the greater is
φ. As the following proposition shows, there is indeed a threshold value of φ such that above
that value, the artist is better oﬀ with piracy than without it.
Proposition 1. There exists a threshold φˆ ∈
(
0, β2α
)
above which piracy is beneﬁcial for the
star. This threshold is given by the solution of the (second degree) equation (17b).
Proof. Equation (17b) represents a parabola in φ, with two real roots. Notice that, for
φ ∈
(
0, β2α
)
, equation (17b) is increasing in φ:
∂Δπs
∂φ
=
(
α
(
1− ds
β
))2
−
(
α(1− c)
2(1− αφ)
)2
> 0 (18)
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The reason for that is that the expression in the second bracket is the quantity produced in
the absence of piracy which, if ds <
β(1−β+c)
2−β , is smaller than the total number of distributed
recordings under piracy (sales and copies, ﬁrst bracket). This is true at least as long as φ ≤ β2α
(the restriction imposed on φ for marginal revenue to be non-degenerate). So the diﬀerence
in proﬁts strictly increases with φ.
The monotonicity of (17b) over the mentioned interval guarantees that there is one and
only one intersection within the interval as long as the function assumes negatives values at
the left extreme of the interval and positive values at the right one.
All we need to show is therefore that Δπs evaluated at φ = 0 is negative (ﬁrst part of
the proof) while it is positive at φ = β2α (second part of the proof). For the ﬁrst part of the
proof, φ = 0, so we obtain the condition
(1− β + ds − c)2 < (1− β)(1− c)2, (19)
which can be rewritten as
(β − ds)2 < 2(1− c)(β − ds)− β(1− c)2. (20)
Given the condition c < 1 − β + ds which is required for the demand to be non-negative, a
suﬃcient condition for (20) to be satisﬁed is
(β − ds)2 < 2(1− 1 + β − ds)(β − ds)− β(1− c)2
and thus
(β − ds)2 > β(1− c)2. (21)
Using again condition c < 1 − β + ds and noting that 1 − c + ds > ds, a suﬃcient condition
for (21) is (1− c+ ds − ds)2 > β(1− c)2 ⇐⇒ β < 1, which is always veriﬁed.
For the second part of the proof, we need to show that Δπs is positive when evaluated at
φ = β2α , that is,
α(1− β + ds − c)2
4(1− β) +
β
2α
(
α
(
1− ds
β
))2
− α(1− c)
2
4(1− β2 )
≥ 0. (22a)
⇐⇒ (β
2 + 2ds − β(1 + c+ ds))2
4β(1− β)(2− β) ≥ 0. (22b)
This last condition is always veriﬁed, with strict inequality as long as (β2 + 2ds − β(1 +
c + d)) 	= 0, which corresponds to saying that Δπs = 0 ⇔ ds = β(1−β+c)2−β , that is, when ds
attains the maximum possible value for which piracy occurs.
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If revenues linked to the artists’ recognition are important, piracy is beneﬁcial to the star.
We can explain this as follows. In the absence of piracy, the artist faces a trade-oﬀ between a
higher margin on record sales on the one hand and higher revenues from alternative sources
on the other hand, given that the latter require that he charge a lower price in order to gain
recognition. Piracy gives the artist a way to increase his recognition without having to reduce
his markup and therefore relaxes this constraint. In a way, it enables the artist to charge
the monopoly price on his residual demand and at the same time to beneﬁt from a high level
of recognition and the associated advantages. If non-CD sale revenues are large, this eﬀect
dominates the reduction in the demand for originals that piracy entails. This extends the
result obtained by Gayer and Shy (2006) to the case where the artist himself sets the price
of his CDs.
If we want to make a statement about what happens to the less-known artist’s proﬁts, we
have to be more precise about what determines the larger cost of piracy. Since the idea is that
the costs of downloading increase with the scarcity of the artist’s recordings, it seems natural
to tie it either to the number of sold recordings or to the artist’s popularity. Of course,
in reality, the distribution of a piece of music through the diﬀerent channels is a dynamic
process. At the beginning, the scarcity of a copy depends mainly on the number of CDs
sold and on the willingness of buyers to share the music on ﬁle-sharing networks. However,
the distinctive feature of digital copying is that you can make copies of copies without losing
quality. Therefore, even if the number of CDs sold is small, the cost of a download is smaller
for more strongly demanded recordings since they are disseminated faster. Hence, it would
appear that it is appropriate to assume that the cost of a download is linked to the proportion
of the population that appreciates an artist’s music. The simplest way to introduce such a
relationship is to assume proportionality of downloading costs with respect to popularity.
Thus, in what follows we assume that du =
α
1−αds.
Then, depending on the value of α, which determines the degree of (un-)popularity of the
less-known artist, there are three possible cases conditional on ds being such that the star is
pirated:
1. If the star is extremely popular relative to the underground artist, so that the latter’s
recordings are very rare, it is prohibitively costly to copy the less-known artist. The
less-known artist faces no threat from piracy. This is the case if αds1−α ≥ β(1+c−(1−α)φ)2(1−(1−α)φ) .
2. If β(1+c−(1−α)φ)2(1−(1−α)φ) >
αds
1−α ≥ β(1−β+c)2−β , the less-known artist chooses to limit-price his
product in order to deter pirates. This unambiguously hurts his proﬁts compared to
the case without piracy.
In both of those cases, only the star’s music is being pirated.
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3. If the level of popularity of the less-known artist exceeds a certain value determined
by the condition α < β(1−β+c)ds(2−β)+β(1−β+c) , there is piracy for both artists. Then, whether
piracy is beneﬁcial to the less-known artist depends on the sign of the diﬀerence between
proﬁts in the two regimes (piracy versus no piracy):
Δπu =
(1− α)
(
1− β + αds1−α − c
)2
4(1− β)
+ φ
(
(1− α)
(
1− αds
(1− α)β
))2
− (1− α)(1− c)
2
4(1− (1− α)φ) ≥ 0 (23)
Case (2) and our numerical example above demonstrate that the star may win from piracy
while the less popular artist may lose. To examine under what conditions piracy is detrimental
to the less-known artist even though it is beneﬁcial to the star, we now take a closer look at
case (3). As the Proposition above shows, the star is strictly better oﬀ with piracy if φ = β2α .
Plugging this into (23), simplifying by (1 − α), and rearranging, we see that the expression
which determines the sign of Δπu is a fourth-degree polynomial in α (the numerator):
Δπu
1− α =
λ0 − λ1α+ λ2α2 − λ3α3 + λ4α4
4αβ(1− α)2(1− β)(αβ + 2α− β) (24)
where
λ0 = 2β
3(β − 1) (25a)
λ1 = β
2(9β2 + 2β(c+ 2ds − 3) + c2 − 2c− 4ds − 3) (25b)
λ2 = β(15β
3 + 2β2(3c+ 7ds − 2) + β(5c2 + 2c(ds − 3) + 2d2s − 6ds − 11)− 2ds(ds + 4)) (25c)
λ311β
4+2β3(3c+8ds+1)+β
2(7c2+2c(2ds−3)+5d2s+4ds−13)+4βds(c−5)−4d2s (25d)
λ4 = 3β
4+2β3(c+3ds+1)+β
2(3c2+2c(ds−1)+3d2s+6ds−5)+4βds(c+ds−3)−4d2s. (25e)
Due to the high degree of diﬃculty of the problem, we perform a numerical analysis of
this expression. We conjecture that Δπu is decreasing in α and has a root between 1/2
and β(1−β+c)ds(2−β)+β(1−β+c) . Our conjecture is supported numerically for many diﬀerent parameter
conﬁgurations. In particular, this is the case for the parameters used in our numerical example
from Section 3.3. Figure 4 shows the graph of the expression that determines the sign of Δπu
as a function of α over the relevant range given by
(
1
2 ,
β(1−β+c)
ds(2−β)+β(1−β+c)
)
for the following
conﬁguration: β = 3/4, c = 1/3, ds = 1/6, φ = 9/16. This corresponds to the parameters used
in the example of section (3.3), with the exception of φ which has been set at its maximum
value consistent with (13). As can be seen from Figure 4, Δπu is positive for low values of α
but turns negative from the point where α = 0.58.
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Figure 4: The diﬀerence in the underground artist’s proﬁt with and without piracy
The intuition for this result is the following. For values of α close to 1/2, the underground
artist does not diﬀer much in his popularity from the star. Accordingly, the cost of download-
ing his music is only slightly higher than for the star. He therefore beneﬁts from the same
eﬀect that the star enjoys which, as described above, consists in getting increased recogni-
tion without having to make concessions regarding the markup on CDs. Initially, this eﬀect
outweighs the substitution of copies for originals caused by the availability of ﬁle sharing.
However, as the popularity of the less-known artist decreases, the cost of downloading his
music rises so that less and less consumers copy. This means that the revenues linked to his
recognition fall, and although his CD sales now suﬀer less than the star’s, the piracy-induced
reduction in demand can no longer be compensated by alternative revenues. In a way, for this
range of α, the underground musician is caught in the middle: he is not popular enough to
replace lost CD sales by revenues out of other sources, but he is too popular for piracy to be
blockaded. In that case, we must conclude that piracy is bad for welfare since, by reducing the
less popular artist’s proﬁts, it may keep him out of the market and therefore reduce musical
variety.
In summary, we have seen that the eﬀects of piracy depend very much on the parameters
of the model. Even assuming we are in a conﬁguration where there is piracy of (at least)
the star’s music, everything is contingent on φ and α. If revenues from sources other than
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CD sales are important, piracy is beneﬁcial for the star. However, it need not be for the less
popular artist if he ﬁnds himself in a middle range of popularity where he can enjoy neither
suﬃcient gains from recognition, nor shelter from pirates.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a simple model of music piracy with popularity-dependent copying costs.
The theoretical literature is largely silent on how piracy may aﬀect diﬀerent types of artists
since it is concerned almost exclusively with single-ﬁrm models. By contrast, anecdotal ev-
idence and recent empirical work suggest that copying has diﬀerential eﬀects on artists de-
pending on their popularity.
We propose to deal with this issue by setting up a model with two types of artists who
diﬀer in their popularity, and by letting the cost incurred by consumers when downloading
an artist’s recording vary with the artist’s level of popularity. More precisely, we assume that
downloading costs increase with the scarcity of a recording, and that scarcity is negatively
related to the artist’s popularity. Moreover, we allow for a second source of revenues for
artists apart from CD sales. We make the assumption that these alternative revenues are
an increasing and convex function of an artist’s recognition as measured by the number of
consumers who obtain his recording either by purchasing the original or downloading a copy.
Our ﬁndings for the more popular artist generalize a result found in a diﬀerent kind
of setup by Gayer and Shy (2006) who assert that piracy is beneﬁcial to the artist when
alternative revenues are important. However, in our model this does not carry over to the
less popular artist, who is found in certain cases to be harmed by piracy even when the
parameter measuring the importance of alternative revenues is set at its maximum. Therefore,
we conclude that piracy is bad for social welfare since it is likely to reduce musical variety.
This negative result may be mitigated when piracy, through its eﬀect on recognition, has
an impact on the probability of an underground artist to become a star, as in Alcala´ and
Gonza´lez-Maestre (2010), which is likely to occur under some imperfections in the talent
revelation process (see Tervio¨, 2009).
22
Alcala´, Francisco and Gonza´lez-Maestre, Miguel (2010): Copying, Superstars, and Artistic
Creation, Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 22, 365-378.
Bae, Sang-Hoo and Choi, Jay Pil (2006): A Model of Piracy, Information Economics and
Policy, Vol. 18, pp. 303-320.
Bain, Joe S. (1956): Barriers to New Competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Belleﬂamme, Paul (2003): Pricing Information Goods in the Presence of Copying, in:
Gordon, W.J. and Watt, R. (eds.), The Economics of Copyright. Developments in Research
and Analysis, Edward Elgar.
Chen, Yeh-ning and Png, Ivan (2003): Information Goods Pricing and Copyright Enforce-
ment: Welfare Analysis, Information Systems Research, Vol. 14(1), pp. 107-123.
Conner, Kathleen R. and Rumelt, Richard P. (1991): Software Piracy: A Strategic Anal-
ysis of Protection, Management Science, Vol. 37, pp. 125-139.
Crampes, Claude and Laﬀont, Jean-Jacques (2002): Copying and Software Pricing, work-
ing paper, Institut d’Economie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
Gayer, Amit and Shy, Oz (2006): Publishers, Artists, and Copyright Enforcement, Infor-
mation Economics and Policy, Vol. 18, pp. 374-384.
Hui, Kai-Lung and Png, Ivan (2003): Piracy and the Legitimate Demand for Recorded
Music, Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Vol. 2(1), Article 11.
King, Stephen P. and Lampe, Ryan (2003): Network Externalities, Price Discrimination
and Proﬁtable Piracy, Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 15, pp. 271-290.
Liebowitz, Stan (1985): Copying and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals,
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 93(5), pp. 945-957.
Liebowitz, Stan (2008): Testing File Sharing’s Impact on Music Album Sales in Cities,
Management Science, Vol. 54(4), pp. 852-859.
Mortimer, Julie Holland, Nosko, Chris, and Sorensen, Alan (2010): Supply Responses
to Digital Distribution: Recorded Music and Live Performances. NBER Working Paper
no. 16507.
Mussa, Michael and Rosen, Sherwin (1978): Monopoly and Product Quality, in: Journal
of Economic Theory, Vol. 18, pp. 301-317.
Oberholzer-Gee, Felix and Strumpf, Koleman (2007): The Eﬀect of File Sharing on Record
Sales: An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 115(1), pp. 1-42.
Oberholzer-Gee, Felix and Strumpf, Koleman (2010): File Sharing and Copyright, in:
Lerner, J. and Stern, S. (eds.), NBER Innovation Policy & the Economy, Vol. 10. Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press.
Peitz, Martin and Waelbroeck, Patrick (2004): The Eﬀect of Internet Piracy on CD Sales:
23
Cross-Section Evidence, Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, Vol. 1(2), pp.
71-79.
Peitz, Martin and Waelbroeck, Patrick (2006a): Piracy of Digital Products: A Critical
Review of the Theoretical Literature, Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 18(4), pp.
449-476.
Peitz, Martin and Waelbroeck, Patrick (2006b): Why the music industry may gain from
free downloading - the role of sampling, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol.
24(5), pp. 907-913.
Pew Institute (2004): Preliminary Results of Survey of Musicians,
http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP Musicians Prelim Findings.pdf
Rob, Rafael and Waldfogel, Joel (2006): Piracy on the High C’s: Music Downloading,
Sales Displacement, and Social Welfare in a Sample of College Students, Journal of Law and
Economics, Vol. 49 (1), pp. 29-62.
Romer, Paul M. (2002): When Should We Use Intellectual Property Rights?, in: American
Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), Vol. 92(2), pp. 213-216.
Shapiro, Carl and Varian, Hal R. (1999): Information Rules. A Strategic Guide to the
Network Economy, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Shy, Oz and Thisse, Jacques-Francois (1999): A Strategic Approach to Software Protec-
tion, in: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 8, pp. 163-190.
Takeyama, Lisa N. (1994): The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of In-
tellectual Property in the Presence of Network Externalities, Journal of Industrial Economics,
Vol. 42, pp. 155-166.
Tervio¨, Marko (2009): Superstars and Mediocrities: Market Failure in the Discovery of
Talent, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 76, pp. 829-850.
The Economist (2003): Unexpected Harmony, January 23,
www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story id=S%27%29H8%28RA7%2A%23%40%21 %5C%0A
Waldfogel, Joel (2010): Music ﬁle sharing and sales displacement in the iTunes era, Infor-
mation Economics and Policy, Vol. 22, pp. 306-314.
Yoon, Kiho (2002): The Optimal Level of Copyright Protection, Information Economics
and Policy, Vol. 14, pp. 327-348.
Zentner, Alejandro (2006): Measuring the Eﬀect of Music Downloads on Music Purchases,
Journal of Law and Economics,Vol. 49(1), pp. 63-90.
Zhang, Michael X. (2002): Stardom, Peer-to-peer and the Socially Optimal Distribution
of Music, working paper, Sloan School of Management, MIT.
24
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2009 
 
2009/1. Rork, J.C.; Wagner, G.A.: "Reciprocity and competition: is there a connection?" 
2009/2. Mork, E.; Sjögren, A.; Svaleryd, H.: "Cheaper child care, more children" 
2009/3. Rodden, J.: "Federalism and inter-regional redistribution" 
2009/4. Ruggeri, G.C.: "Regional fiscal flows: measurement tools" 
2009/5. Wrede, M.: "Agglomeration, tax competition, and fiscal equalization" 
2009/6. Jametti, M.; von Ungern-Sternberg, T.: "Risk selection in natural disaster insurance" 
2009/7. Solé-Ollé, A; Sorribas-Navarro, P.: "The dynamic adjustment of local government budgets: does Spain 
behave differently?" 
2009/8. Sanromá, E.; Ramos, R.; Simón, H.: "Immigration wages in the Spanish Labour Market: Does the origin of 
human capital matter?" 
2009/9. Mohnen, P.; Lokshin, B.: "What does it take for and R&D incentive policy to be effective?" 
2009/10. Solé-Ollé, A.; Salinas, P..: "Evaluating the effects of decentralization on educational outcomes in Spain" 
2009/11. Libman, A.; Feld, L.P.: "Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The case of Russia" 
2009/12. Falck, O.; Fritsch, M.; Heblich, S.: "Bohemians, human capital, and regional economic growth" 
2009/13. Barrio-Castro, T.; García-Quevedo, J.: "The determinants of university patenting: do incentives matter?" 
2009/14. Schmidheiny, K.; Brülhart, M.: "On the equivalence of location choice models: conditional logit, nested 
logit and poisson" 
2009/15. Itaya, J., Okamuraz, M., Yamaguchix, C.: "Partial tax coordination in a repeated game setting" 
2009/16. Ens, P.: "Tax competition and equalization: the impact of voluntary cooperation on the efficiency goal" 
2009/17. Geys, B., Revelli, F.: "Decentralization, competition and the local tax mix: evidence from Flanders" 
2009/18. Konrad, K., Kovenock, D.: "Competition for fdi with vintage investment and agglomeration advantages" 
2009/19. Loretz, S., Moorey, P.: "Corporate tax competition between firms" 
2009/20. Akai, N., Sato, M.: "Soft budgets and local borrowing regulation in a dynamic decentralized leadership 
model with saving and free mobility" 
2009/21. Buzzacchi, L., Turati, G.: "Collective risks in local administrations: can a private insurer be better than a 
public mutual fund?" 
2009/22. Jarkko, H.: "Voluntary pension savings: the effects of the finnish tax reform on savers’ behaviour" 
2009/23. Fehr, H.; Kindermann, F.: "Pension funding and individual accounts in economies with life-cyclers and 
myopes" 
2009/24. Esteller-Moré, A.; Rizzo, L.: "(Uncontrolled) Aggregate shocks or vertical tax interdependence? Evidence 
from gasoline and cigarettes" 
2009/25. Goodspeed, T.; Haughwout, A.: "On the optimal design of disaster insurance in a federation" 
2009/26. Porto, E.; Revelli, F.: "Central command, local hazard and the race to the top" 
2009/27. Piolatto, A.: "Plurality versus proportional electoral rule: study of voters’ representativeness" 
2009/28. Roeder, K.: "Optimal taxes and pensions in a society with myopic agents" 
2009/29, Porcelli, F.: "Effects of fiscal decentralisation and electoral accountability on government efficiency 
evidence from the Italian health care sector" 
2009/30, Troumpounis, O.: "Suggesting an alternative electoral proportional system. Blank votes count" 
2009/31, Mejer, M., Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B.: "Economic incongruities in the European patent system" 
2009/32, Solé-Ollé, A.: "Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure  investment: tactical or programmatic?" 
2009/33, Joanis, M.: "Sharing the blame? Local electoral accountability and centralized school finance in California" 
2009/34, Parcero, O.J.: "Optimal country’s policy towards multinationals when local regions can choose between 
firm-specific and non-firm-specific policies" 
2009/35, Cordero, J,M.; Pedraja, F.; Salinas, J.: "Efficiency measurement in the Spanish cadastral units through 
DEA" 
2009/36, Fiva, J.; Natvik, G.J.: "Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?" 
2009/37, Haupt, A.; Krieger, T.: "The role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition" 
2009/38, Viladecans-Marsal, E; Arauzo-Carod, J.M.: "Can a knowledge-based cluster be created? The case of the 
Barcelona 22@district" 
 
2010 
 
2010/1, De Borger, B., Pauwels, W.: "A Nash bargaining solution to models of tax and investment competition: tolls 
and investment in serial transport corridors" 
2010/2, Chirinko, R.; Wilson, D.: "Can lower tax rates be bought? Business rent-seeking and tax competition 
among U.S. States" 
2010/3, Esteller-Moré, A.; Rizzo, L.: "Politics or mobility? Evidence from us excise taxation" 
2010/4, Roehrs, S.; Stadelmann, D.: "Mobility and local income redistribution" 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2010/5, Fernández Llera, R.; García Valiñas, M.A.: "Efficiency and elusion: both sides of public enterprises in 
Spain" 
2010/6, González Alegre, J.: "Fiscal decentralization and intergovernmental grants: the European regional policy 
and Spanish autonomous regions" 
2010/7, Jametti, M.; Joanis, M.: "Determinants of fiscal decentralization: political economy aspects" 
2010/8, Esteller-Moré, A.; Galmarini, U.; Rizzo, L.: "Should tax bases overlap in a federation with lobbying?" 
2010/9, Cubel, M.: "Fiscal equalization and political conflict" 
2010/10, Di Paolo, A.; Raymond, J.L.; Calero, J.: "Exploring educational mobility in Europe" 
2010/11, Aidt, T.S.; Dutta, J.: "Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability" 
2010/12, Arqué Castells, P.: "Venture capital and innovation at the firm level" 
2010/13, García-Quevedo, J.; Mas-Verdú, F.; Polo-Otero, J.: "Which firms want PhDS? The effect of the 
university-industry relationship on the PhD labour market" 
2010/14, Calabrese, S.; Epple, D.: "On the political economy of tax limits" 
2010/15, Jofre-Monseny, J.: "Is agglomeration taxable?" 
2010/16, Dragu, T.; Rodden, J.: "Representation and regional redistribution in federations" 
2010/17, Borck, R; Wimbersky, M.: "Political economics of higher education finance" 
2010/18, Dohse, D; Walter, S.G.: "The role of entrepreneurship education and regional context in forming 
entrepreneurial intentions" 
2010/19, Åslund, O.; Edin, P-A.; Fredriksson, P.; Grönqvist, H.: "Peers, neighborhoods and immigrant student 
achievement - Evidence from a placement policy" 
2010/20, Pelegrín, A.; Bolance, C.: "International industry migration and firm characteristics: some evidence from 
the analysis of firm data" 
2010/21, Koh, H.; Riedel, N.: "Do governments tax agglomeration rents?" 
2010/22, Curto-Grau, M.; Herranz-Loncán, A.; Solé-Ollé, A.: "The political economy of infraestructure 
construction: The Spanish “Parliamentary Roads” (1880-1914)" 
2010/23, Bosch, N.; Espasa, M.; Mora, T.: "Citizens’ control and the efficiency of local public services" 
2010/24, Ahamdanech-Zarco, I.; García-Pérez, C.; Simón, H.: "Wage inequality in Spain: A regional perspective" 
2010/25, Folke, O.: “Shades of brown and green: Party effects in proportional election systems” 
2010/26, Falck, O.; Heblich, H.; Lameli, A.; Südekum, J.: “Dialects, cultural identity and economic exchange” 
2010/27, Baum-Snow, N.; Pavan, R.: “Understanding the city size wage gap” 
2010/28, Molloy, R.; Shan, H.: “The effect of gasoline prices on household location” 
2010/29, Koethenbuerger, M.: “How do local governments decide on public policy in fiscal federalism? Tax vs. 
expenditure optimization” 
2010/30, Abel, J.; Dey, I.; Gabe, T.: “Productivity and the density of human capital” 
2010/31, Gerritse, M.: “Policy competition and agglomeration:  a local government view” 
2010/32, Hilber, C.; Lyytikäinen, T.; Vermeulen, W.: “Capitalization of central government grants into local house 
prices: panel data evidence from England” 
2010/33, Hilber, C.; Robert-Nicoud, F.: “On the origins of land use regulations: theory and evidence from us metro 
areas” 
2010/34, Picard, P.; Tabuchi, T.: “City with forward and backward linkages” 
2010/35, Bodenhorn, H.; Cuberes, D.: “Financial development and city growth: evidence from Northeastern 
American cities, 1790-1870” 
2010/36, Vulovic, V.: “The effect of sub-national borrowing control on fiscal sustainability: how to regulate?” 
2010/37, Flamand, S.: “Interregional transfers, group loyalty and the decentralization of redistribution” 
2010/38, Ahlfeldt, G.; Feddersen, A.: “From periphery to core: economic adjustments to high speed rail” 
2010/39, González-Val, R.; Pueyo, F.: “First nature vs. second nature causes: industry location and growth in the 
presence of an open-access renewable resource” 
2010/40, Billings, S.; Johnson, E.: “A nonparametric test for industrial specialization” 
2010/41, Lee, S.; Li, Q.: “Uneven landscapes and the city size distribution” 
2010/42, Ploeckl. F.: “Borders, market access and urban growth; the case of Saxon towns and the Zollverein” 
2010/43, Hortas-Rico, M.: “Urban sprawl and municipal budgets in Spain: a dynamic panel data analysis” 
2010/44, Koethenbuerger, M.: “Electoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germany” 
2010/45, Solé-Ollé, A.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent 
evidence from Spain” 
2010/46, Larcinese, V.; Rizzo; L.; Testa, C.: “Why do small states receive more federal money? Us senate 
representation and the allocation of federal budget” 
2010/47, Patacchini, E.; Zenou, Y.: “Neighborhood effects and parental involvement in the intergenerational 
transmission of education” 
2010/48, Nedelkoska, L.: “Occupations at risk: explicit task content and job security” 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 
 
2010/49, Jofre-Monseny, J.; Marín-López, R.; Viladecans-Marsal, E.: “The mechanisms of agglomeration: 
Evidence from the effect of inter-industry relations on the location of new firms” 
2010/50, Revelli, F.: “Tax mix corners and other kinks” 
2010/51, Duch-Brown, N.; Parellada-Sabata M.; Polo-Otero, J.: “Economies of scale and scope of university 
research and technology transfer: a flexible multi-product approach” 
2010/52, Duch-Brown, N.; Vilalta M.: “Can better governance increase university efficiency?” 
2010/53, Cremer, H.; Goulão, C.: “Migration and social insurance” 
2010/54, Mittermaier, F; Rincke, J.: “Do countries compensate firms for international wage differentials?” 
2010/55, Bogliacino, F; Vivarelli, M.: “The job creation effect or R&D expenditures” 
2010/56, Piacenza, M; Turati, G.: “Does fiscal discipline towards sub-national governments affect citizens’ well-
being? Evidence on health” 
 
2011 
 
2011/1, Oppedisano, V; Turati, G.: "What are the causes of educational inequalities and of their evolution over time 
in Europe? Evidence from PISA" 
2011/2, Dahlberg, M; Edmark, K; Lundqvist, H.: "Ethnic diversity and preferences for redistribution " 
2011/3, Canova, L.; Vaglio, A.: "Why do educated mothers matter? A model of parental help” 
2011/4, Delgado, F.J.; Lago-Peñas, S.; Mayor, M.: “On the determinants of local tax rates: new evidence from 
spain” 

